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HOW PERMANENT BECAME TEMPORARY IN
DEL MONTE DUNES
MICHAEL C. LEVINE
Regulatory takings are like car accidents. They fascinate us. We can-
not help slowing down to look. What a disaster, we say to ourselves.
We are so glad it did not happen to us. But we wonder if we could be
next. We think about who is at fault, who should pay for the damages,
and how it all could have been avoided in the first place. And we
question how the rules of the road could be improved so that such
collisions in the future could be averted.1
The concept of a regulatory taking was first recognized in the
late 1800s.2 In the century since, innumerable federal judges, profes-
sors, and other commentators have managed so to convolute that
area of the law that it does, indeed, resemble a car wreck or an im-
penetrable jungle rather than a discrete legal principle. In fact, it has
been written that “[t]hroughout constitutional jurisprudence, only the
right of privacy can compete seriously with takings law for the doc-
trine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize.”3
1. G. Richard Hill, Partial Takings After Dolan, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT
CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 189, 189 (David L. Cal-
lies ed., 1996) [hereinafter TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS].
2. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), is widely recognized as the first Supreme Court
case to acknowledge that a regulatory taking was possible. See Terri L. Lindfors, Property-
Regulatory Takings and the Expansion of Burdens on Common Citizens, 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 255, 260 (1998).
3. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993); see also BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) (“I have not encountered
a single lawyer, judge, or scholar who views existing case-law as anything but a chaos of con-
fused argument which ought to be set right if one only knew how.”); Richard L. Settle, Regula-
tory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 339, 339 (“Regulatory taking doctrine is the most perplexing area of American land use
law.”).
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At first, it is difficult to imagine how and why takings law has
fallen into such disarray. The Fifth Amendment’s admonition that
“[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation,”4 seems simple enough. Indeed, Professor Laurence
Tribe has stated that “[m]ost people know a taking when they see
one, or at least they think they do.”5 However, recognizing the cir-
cumstances that may give rise to a constitutional deprivation is only
the initial step in a takings analysis. One must then establish whether
the perceived injury is temporary or permanent, regulatory or physi-
cal, and determine which standards apply to decide if the violation
was, indeed, a taking. It is in resolving these questions that much of
the confusion arises.
In particular, the distinction between temporary and permanent
regulatory takings has become blurred by increasingly complex fac-
tual situations.6 The Court’s simple definition of temporary regulatory
takings as involving regulations ultimately “abandon[ed] by the gov-
ernment”7 is no longer sufficient. Nor is the increasing reliance upon
the assertion that “temporary reversible ‘takings’ should be analyzed
according to the same constitutional framework applied to permanent
irreversible ‘takings.’”8 The shortcomings of these two ideas were
made apparent by the Supreme Court’s recent holding in City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd.9
Briefly, the Del Monte Dunes litigation involved a jury verdict
requiring the city of Monterey to compensate a developer $1.45 mil-
lion for the five years between the city’s final denial of a building
permit and the developer’s sale of the property to the state of Cali-
fornia.10 While it is clear that compensation was awarded for a finite
period of time, the court never characterized the taking as permanent
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592 (2d ed. 1988).
6. See generally Gregory M. Stein, Pinpointing the Beginning and Ending of a Temporary
Regulatory Taking, 70 WASH. L. REV. 953 (1996) (noting this phenomenon and proposing the
use of case law to determine the point at which a regulatory taking begins and ends).
7. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987). In contrast, a permanent regulatory taking is effected by a regulation which the govern-
ment cannot, or chooses not to, “abandon.” For example, a city’s insistence that a landowner
devote a portion of its land to a bike path would effect a permanent regulatory taking. See Do-
lan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1984).
8. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
9. 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999) [hereinafter 
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or temporary.11 Similarly, in upholding the verdict, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals did not once refer to the city’s action as a “tempo-
rary taking.”12 Rather, it found solely that a reasonable jury could
have determined that the city’s actions met the criteria for a perma-
nent regulatory taking.13 The Supreme Court, also without analyzing
the nature of the takings claim, affirmed the decision.14 In fact, in its
opinion, the Court assumed that the taking was temporary and ex-
pressly declined “to define with precision the elements of a temporary
regulatory takings claim.”15
However, Del Monte Dunes does not involve a typical temporary
regulatory taking. While the taking was assumed to be temporary be-
cause compensation was sought for a finite period of time, there was
no “abandoned” regulation. Rather, the compensatory period was
limited by the developer’s sale of the plot of land. Further, inherent in
each court’s analysis was the understanding that the landowner would
never be able to develop the specified plot of land.16 Because this sce-
nario has elements of both a permanent and temporary taking, it pre-
sented an ideal opportunity for the Supreme Court to distinguish be-
tween the two explicitly. However, the Court chose not to take that
opportunity, and thereby missed an excellent chance to provide guid-
ance and clarification in this convoluted area of the law. Also, by al-
lowing a landowner, rather than the city, to terminate the taking, the
Court expanded the realm of compensable temporary takings without
so much as a word of explanation for its decision to do so. Although
this issue was not raised in the petition for certiorari, the Court
should have used its opinion to refine its takings jurisprudence.
To explain the action that should have been taken by the Court,
Part I of this Note will provide a brief outline of the Del Monte Dunes
litigation. Part II will then examine the current state of regulatory
takings jurisprudence, paying special attention to the futility excep-
tion to the final agency action requirement. Part III will follow by ex-
plaining that Del Monte Dunes did not involve a typical temporary
11. See id. (reproducing the district court’s jury instruction, which focused on whether the
plaintiff was denied all economically viable use of the property without distinguishing tempo-
rary from permanent loss).
12. See Del Monte Dunes, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1430-34 (9th Cir. 1996)
[hereinafter Del Monte Dunes II].
13. See id. at 1434.
14. See Del Monte Dunes III, 119 S. Ct. at 1634.
15. Id. at 1644.
16. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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taking. This part will demonstrate how the judicial analyses and pro-
cedural posture of the case led to confusion between temporary and
permanent takings law. Finally, Part IV will conclude that the Court
need not have developed a new substantive analysis to dispel this con-
fusion, but, rather, should have drawn more concrete boundaries be-
tween permanent and temporary takings. The Court could have ex-
plained that this situation was a new sort of temporary taking in
which the landowner was permitted to remove the government’s
choice to rescind the offending regulation. Alternatively, the Court
might have stated explicitly that the case did not involve a temporary
taking at all, but a permanent taking for which the developer was al-
lowed compensation only for a limited time. The second option is
preferable because it would have allowed the Court to make use of its
existing jurisprudence without expanding the realm of compensable
temporary takings.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DEL MONTE DUNES
Monterey, California, was the focal point for the latest battle in
the ongoing saga of takings jurisprudence. For twelve years prior to
being heard in the Supreme Court, the city of Monterey was locked in
litigation with developers over a 37.6-acre plot of ocean-front land
known as the “Dunes.”17 The dispute began with a five-year dis-
agreement over building permits that led to a lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California. The case
was heard twice by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and decided
finally by the Supreme Court in May 1999.18 In that time, however,
not one court addressed the distinction between temporary and per-
manent regulatory takings. To understand fully the opportunity pre-
sented to the Supreme Court to distinguish explicitly between these
two types of regulatory takings, it is necessary to sort through some of
the details of the litigation.
This procedural nightmare began in 1981 when Ponderosa
Homes, then the owner of the Dunes, applied for a permit to build
344 residential units at that location.19 Although the 344-unit proposal
17. See Del Monte Dunes, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1990)
[hereinafter Del Monte Dunes I]. Apparently, the land was previously used as a dumping ground
for empty oil storage tanks. See David G. Savage, Land of Opportunity: Can Property Owners
Sue over a City’s Regulatory Decision?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 35.
18. See Del Monte Dunes III, 119 S. Ct. at 1645.
19. See Del Monte Dunes I, 920 F.2d at 1499.
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was within the density limits imposed by the existing zoning ordi-
nance, the city planning commission denied the permit.20 The city,
however, indicated that a proposal for development of 264 units
would be looked upon more favorably.21 Ponderosa then submitted
such a proposal, and it was promptly rejected.22 Again following the
city planner’s advice, Ponderosa next submitted a plan for 224 units.23
Once more, the city planning commission denied the building per-
mit.24 Ponderosa appealed that determination to the city council,
which requested that the commission consider a proposal for 190
units.25 While this proposal was under evaluation, Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey (“Del Monte”), the plaintiffs in the litigation, purchased
the Dunes from Ponderosa and pursued the application.26 The change
in ownership did not affect the developer’s luck, however, as the city
planning commission once again rejected the development proposal.27
In September 1984, three years after the original development
proposal, the city council overruled the planning commission and ap-
proved the plan for 190 residential units.28 The approval was subject
to Del Monte’s fulfilling several conditions prior to developing, in-
cluding access requirements, fencing and grading specifications, and
the provision of moderate-income housing.29 Further, Del Monte was
required to obtain approval of a plan to conserve the habitat of the
Smith’s Blue Butterfly, an endangered species thought to inhabit the
area.30 Del Monte then submitted a revised project plan that it hoped
would meet the conditions imposed by the city council. Despite a fa-
vorable review by its professional staff, the planning commission de-
nied a permit for the new proposal in January 1986.31






26. See id. at 1499.
27. See id. at 1502.
28. See id. In overruling the planning commission, the city council granted Del Monte an
18-month use permit. See id.
29. See id. at 1503.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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Del Monte appealed this decision to the city council, which up-
held the planning commission’s determination.32 Del Monte then filed
suit in the District Court for the Northern District of California,
claiming that the permit denial effected a regulatory taking, violated
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and violated the common law principles of estoppel and
unjust enrichment.33 In support of these claims, the developer’s attor-
ney stated that “his clients were given a runaround by the city planing
commission and the city council” and, specifically, that “‘[e]very time
they satisfied one condition [to win the permit], the city came up with
a new one.’”34 Despite Del Monte’s assertions that the city would
never allow it to build on the Dunes, the district court dismissed the
claims as unripe because the city had not issued a final permit denial.35
Del Monte appealed this determination to the Ninth Circuit as it re-
lated to the takings, due process, and equal protection claims.
The Ninth Circuit found the claims ripe for review because any
further reapplication would have been futile.36 The court went on to
state that “[r]equiring appellants to persist with this protracted appli-
cation process to meet the [finality] requirement would implicate the
concerns about disjointed, repetitive, and unfair procedures” that the
futility exception was designed to prevent.37 Further, the court held
that “the failure to seek a variance [did] not affect the ripeness of ap-
pellants’ claim” because the “proposed development did not conflict
with express terms in the city’s zoning ordinances or its general land
32. See id. The city council denied the permit for six reasons: (1) necessary sand relocation
would cause unmitigable environmental damage; (2) development would impact flora and fauna
in ways that would not be adequately mitigated; (3) the plan did not provide adequate access to
and from the property; (4) the development was likely to cause damage to the Smith’s Blue But-
terfly habitat; (5) the project did not conform with the General Plan because it did not protect
important flora and fauna; and (6) no showing of overriding considerations was made such that
the project should be allowed to proceed in light of the environmental damage it would cause.
See id. at 1504-05.
33. See id. at 1500.
34. Savage, supra note 17, at 35. As one commentator put it:
Building on the high ground was rejected because the homes could be seen from the
highway . . . . Building near the ocean was rejected because the beach must be pre-
served for the public’s use . . . . And the remaining acres – a sunken-bowl area in the
center of the dunes – were said to be a home for the endangered, and elusive, Smith’s
Blue Butterfly.
Id.
35. See Del Monte Dunes I, 920 F.2d at 1500.
36. See id. at 1506.
37. Id.
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use plan.”38 In so holding, the court rejected the city’s assertion that
Del Monte’s claim was not ripe because it had not submitted enough
proposals to pinpoint the exact level of development that the city
would allow.39
The case was then remanded to the district court for trial. The
trial judge disposed of Del Monte’s substantive due process claim40
and ordered the equal protection and takings claims tried to a jury.41
Prior to trial, Del Monte sold the Dunes to the state of California for
$4.5 million, which was $800,000 more than it had paid for the land
seven years earlier.42 Despite the sale, Del Monte continued with its
claim, and the case went to trial in early 1994.43 The jury, instructed
separately on the takings and equal protection claims, returned a ver-
dict in favor of Del Monte for $1.45 million.44 This award was ostensi-
bly for damages suffered between the 1986 denial of the final permit
application and Del Monte’s 1991 sale of the property. It also “re-
sulted from the City’s liability for both the takings and the equal pro-
tection claims.”45
The city promptly appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed
the award.46 The city’s timely petition for certiorari was granted solely
to resolve the regulatory takings issues.47 The following questions
were presented to the Court for review:
38. Id. at 1502.
39. See id.
40. The judge found that the city did not violate Del Monte’s due process rights because it
asserted valid regulatory reasons for denying the construction permit. See Del Monte Dunes II,
95 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1996).
41. See id.
42. See Savage, supra note 17, at 35.
43. See id.
44. See Del Monte Dunes II, 95 F.3d at 1425-26.
45. Id. at 1426.
46. In relevant part, the court found that a reasonable jury could have found a taking on
either of the two grounds put to it. That is, the court determined that there was sufficient evi-
dence such that a jury could have found a taking either because “the City’s denial of Del
Monte’s application lacked a sufficient nexus with its stated objectives,” or “because it denied
Del Monte all economically viable use of its property.” Id. at 1432. The court also determined
that the trial court did not err by submitting the inverse condemnation claim, and specifically
the issue of liability, to a jury. See id. at 1426-30. In addition, the court used the “rough propor-
tionality” test and upheld the damage award as reasonable. See Del Monte Dunes II, 95 F.3d at
1435. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), for an explanation of the rough propor-
tionality test.
47. See Del Monte Dunes, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 118 S. Ct. 1359 (1998) (granting certio-
rari).
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(1) whether issues of liability were properly submitted to the jury . . .
(2) whether the Court of Appeals impermissibly based its decision
on a standard that allowed the jury to reweigh the reasonableness of
the city’s land-use decision, and (3) whether the Court of Appeals
erred in assuming that the rough-proportionality standard . . . ap-
plied to this case . . . .48
The Court found in favor of upholding the award on each of the first
two issues and, on the third, found that the Dolan rough-
proportionality standard, while not properly extended beyond the
context of exactions, was inapposite in this case.49 In making these de-
terminations, however, the Court expressly declined to provide an
analytical framework for temporary regulatory takings.50 In fact, the
Court did not discuss any distinction between temporary and perma-
nent regulatory takings analyses.
II. THE JUMBLED JURISPRUDENCE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
Del Monte Dunes is only the latest chapter in the judiciary’s con-
tinuing effort to explain takings law. Numerous judges and commen-
tators have attempted to develop an analytic framework for takings
jurisprudence.51 None, however, has provided a satisfactory method
for distinguishing temporary from permanent regulatory takings. By
refusing to make explicit an analytic framework for temporary regula-
tory takings in Del Monte Dunes, the Supreme Court missed an op-
portunity to simplify this area of the law. To appreciate fully the niche
into which the Del Monte Dunes litigation fits, one must first under-
stand the fundamentals of permanent and temporary takings analysis.
48. Del Monte Dunes III, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1635 (1999).
49. See id. at 1635-37. Briefly, the rough-proportionality standard requires that, when a
government agency compels a landowner to surrender a portion of his land in furtherance of a
legitimate governmental objective, the required exaction must be proportional to the benefit
achieved. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the
city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”).
50. See Del Monte Dunes III, 119 S. Ct. at 1644 (stating that “[t]he posture of the case does
not present an appropriate occasion to define with precision the elements of a temporary regu-
latory takings claim”); see also id. at 1636 (“The city did not challenge below the applicability or
continued viability of the general test for regulatory takings liability . . . . Given the posture of
the case before us, we decline the suggestions of amici to revisit these precedents.”).
51. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Rubenfeld,
supra note 3; Stein, supra note 6.
LEVINE TO PRINTER.DOC 05/23/00 8:55 AM
1999] HOW PERMANENT BECAME TEMPORARY 811
A. Analyzing Physical and Regulatory Takings
At the most basic level, a taking can be either physical or regula-
tory and either permanent or temporary.52 The law surrounding
physical takings, both permanent and temporary, has been fairly well
settled for some time.53 The simplest physical taking occurs when a
government exercises its power of eminent domain to occupy private
property “in the name of some ostensible public good.”54 It is clear
that such occupations require compensation. Thus, when the govern-
ment takes property permanently—for example, to build a road—it
must compensate the landowner by paying him fair market value. It
also must compensate a landowner if the physical invasion is tempo-
rary. Thus, when the government occupies a home or place of busi-
ness temporarily—for instance, during a time of war—it generally
must pay fair rental value for that time.55
An overt physical invasion, however, is only one type of compen-
sable taking. Since the late 1800s,56 courts have recognized that a gov-
ernment also might take private property indirectly by regulating it
too stringently. However, the principles applicable to regulatory tak-
ings are much less clearly defined than those pertaining to physical
occupations. These rules are complicated by the fact that state and lo-
cal governments are unquestionably authorized to undertake some
degree of land-use planning and regulation.57 Thus, the simple issu-
52. See, e.g., Lindfors, supra note 2, at 262 (“Cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause have generally distinguished between physical occupations authorized by the
government and governmental regulations of property use.”); see also Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1949) (recognizing that a landowner could be deprived of his
property temporarily).
53. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1081 (“The most historically settled application of the
Just Compensation Clause—indeed perhaps the only historically settled application—is the re-
quirement that government must pay for property it seizes through an exercise of eminent do-
main.”).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1949) (holding that the
federal government was required to compensate for lost rent as well as lost “trade routes” when
it occupied a laundry during World War II); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 382-83 (1945) (determining that the government owed compensation for its temporary oc-
cupation of part of a General Motors plant equal to the amount of rent that could have been
earned over that time for that part of a similarly equipped facility).
56. See supra note 2.
57. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (reasoning that “the authority of
state and local governments to engage in land use planning has been sustained against constitu-
tional challenge” since 1926 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926)); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987)
(“Long ago it was recognized that ‘all property in this country is held under the implied obliga-
LEVINE TO PRINTER.DOC 05/23/00 8:55 AM
812 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:803
ance of a restrictive zoning ordinance, without a particularized show-
ing of harm, does not constitute a taking.58 Further, because regula-
tory situations are factually distinct, courts have been reluctant to is-
sue categorical rules.59 Thus, since 1922, “[t]he general rule at least
[has been], that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”60 However,
in the seventy-five years since Justice Holmes established this oft-
quoted standard, courts have struggled to determine just how far is
“too far.”
Despite the dearth of precise rules, a general framework has
been developed in which to make this determination. Essentially, the
court undertakes a two-tiered analysis when deciding whether a
regulation effects a taking. It looks first to the character of the gov-
ernmental action and, second, to the impact of that action on the
landowner. Initially, then, a court “explores the legitimacy of the gov-
ernmental action” and determines “whether the purpose of the regu-
latory action is a ‘legitimate state interest’ and . . . whether the means
used to achieve the objective ‘substantially advances’ the intended
purpose.”61 Although all sides in the Del Monte Dunes litigation agree
that the city was advancing a legitimate state interest by restricting
development and preserving natural habitat, there was significant dis-
agreement about whether the permit denials substantially advanced
that purpose.62
tion that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the community.’” (quoting Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887)).
58. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (finding that a general zoning
ordinance that allowed only one house per five-acre plot did not constitute a taking because it
advanced a legitimate public interest); see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-95 (1981) (finding a takings claim to be fatally deficient because the
claimant did not identify any particular land that was affected by the regulation but, rather, sim-
ply challenged it generally).
59. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1047 (1992) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
60. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (declaring unconstitutional a
Pennsylvania law that prohibited the mining of underground coal reserves if that mining would
result in surface subsidence).
61. Robert H. Freilich et al., Regulatory Takings: Factoring Partial Deprivations into the
Taking Equation, in TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS, supra note 1, at 165, 166.
62. See Del Monte Dunes II, 95 F.3d 1422, 1430 (9th Cir. 1996) (“For purposes of re-
view[] . . . we assume that the City’s stated interests of protecting the environment and health
and safety of its citizens were legitimate.”). While the debate about whether the method chosen
by the city “substantially advances” this purpose was very much alive in the Supreme Court, the
inquiry does not factor into the analysis undertaken in this Note. Rather, the “substantially ad-
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If the legitimacy prong is met, the court will then analyze the im-
pact of the regulation on the property owner. Generally, it will do so
by examining the character of the governmental action, the economic
impact on the property owner, and any interference with the owner’s
investment-backed expectations.63 If the impact is disproportionate to
the state interest advanced, a taking will be found. However, in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,64 the Supreme Court determined
that there exist “two discrete categories of regulatory action [that are]
compensable without case-specific inquiry.”65 First, any regulation
that subjects a landowner to a “physical invasion” of his property is
considered, per se, to constitute a taking.66 Second, and more impor-
tant for purposes of this Note, “per se” takings also encompass regu-
lations that deny a landowner “all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land.”67 “If either of these per se situations has occurred,
the court will decree a taking, and the inquiry will cease.”68 Thus, the
Court in Del Monte Dunes was not required to balance the three fac-
tors because the landowners claimed that the permit denials effected
a per se taking by denying them “all economically viable use” of the
land.69
vances” analysis informs the debate surrounding the applicability of the Dolan rough-
proportionality standard to zoning regulations. See id.
63. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (establishing the ad
hoc, factual inquiry for regulatory takings); Freilich et al., supra note 61, at 178; see also Dodd v.
Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen a government regulation
prohibits something less than all economically beneficial use and causes at most a partial loss in
economic use, the fact that there has been no categorical taking does not end the analysis under
federal law.”).
64. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
65. Id. at 1015.
66. Id. The epitome of a “physical invasion” per se takings case is Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, the Court found that landowners must
be compensated when a regulation required them to allow installation of cable equipment in
their buildings. See id. at 421.
67. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
68. Freilich et al., supra note 61, at 166.
69. The landowner also claimed that the permit denials did not substantially advance the
legitimate state interest. See Del Monte Dunes II, 95 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir. 1996). The litiga-
tion proceeded according to the rule established in Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997
F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1993), which provides that “[a] zoning law effects a taking if (1) it does not
substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest; or (2) it denies an owner economically
viable use of his land.” Id. at 615 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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B. Temporary Regulatory Takings
The framework for regulatory takings analysis described above
was developed in reference to permanent takings. However, not all
regulations are put in place permanently. Thus, “a regulatory ‘taking’
may be temporary, by virtue of the government’s power to rescind or
amend the regulation.”70 For many years, such temporary takings
were not recognized as constitutional deprivations. Thus, a regulation
that prevented economic use of property for a period of time and was
then declared invalid or rescinded was not considered to effect a
compensable taking. However, in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles,71 the Supreme Court found explic-
itly that “[i]nvalidation of the ordinance . . . though converting the
taking into a ‘temporary’ one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the
demands of the Just Compensation Clause.”72 Rather, “‘temporary’
takings which . . . deny a landowner all use of his property[] are not
different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation.”73
First English revolutionized takings jurisprudence by allowing
monetary compensation in circumstances in which only injunctive re-
lief or invalidation had been available previously. In so doing, it also
contributed mightily to the growing confusion surrounding takings
law. While courts have generally found that “temporary reversible
‘takings’ should be analyzed according to the same constitutional
framework applied to permanent irreversible ‘takings,’”74 they have
had to adapt the determinative framework described above to apply it
to temporary takings.75 In addition, courts have had to develop en-
70. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
71. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
72. Id. at 319. In First English, the plaintiff church owned land on which it administered a
campground. After a flood destroyed the campground buildings, Los Angeles County instituted
a temporary regulation prohibiting reconstruction of buildings in a flood control area. The
church filed suit complaining that the ordinance effected a taking. The Supreme Court found
that if the ordinance effected a taking, simply invalidating it was an insufficient remedy and the
church was entitled to monetary compensation for the period of time during which it was in ef-
fect. See id. at 307-08, 319.
73. Id. at 318; see also San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that ‘takings’ must be permanent and ir-
revocable.”).
74. San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. The framework is complicated in the context of a reversible regulation because it be-
comes increasingly difficult to separate a temporary taking from a permissible land-use ordi-
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tirely new formulae for determining “just compensation.” Compen-
sating for a permanent taking involves the relatively simple task of
determining the fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking.76 However, adding a temporal element to the calculation
makes it significantly more difficult.77
Finally, courts also must determine the beginning and end of a
temporary taking. Unfortunately, however, while the Court has made
it clear that the government must compensate a landowner for the pe-
riod during which the taking is effective,78 it “has offered little guid-
ance as to when a temporary regulatory taking begins and ends.”79
This problem is particularly significant in the current context because
ill-defined temporal boundaries may blur the distinction between
permanent and temporary takings. In this case, for example, the
plaintiffs could have claimed that the taking began at almost any
point during the five years in which they were applying for a building
permit. To make matters worse, this problem may affect the point at
which the temporary takings claim becomes ripe for adjudication.
C. Ripeness and the Futility Exception
To prove that a regulatory takings claim is ripe for review, a
plaintiff must show that “the government entity charged with imple-
menting the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the ap-
plication of the regulations to the property at issue.”80 The finality re-
nance. Lucas was decided after First English and was intended, at least partly, to help stem the
burgeoning confusion. The Court’s success or failure in this endeavor is discussed at some
length below. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
76. See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 271 (11th Cir. 1987) (instructing
that the “trial court should award ‘market rate return computed over the period of the tempo-
rary taking on the difference between the property’s fair market value without the regulatory
restriction and its fair market value with the restriction’” (quoting Nemmers v. City of Du-
buque, 764 F.2d 502, 505 (8th Cir. 1985))).
77. See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatory Takings: Beyond the Balancing Test, in
REGULATORY TAKING: THE LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROLS 191, 232-33 (G. Richard Hill ed.,
1990) (“[First English] also poses difficult problems of valuation. It remains to be decided, for
example, to what degree compensation awards should be off-set to reflect less drastic restric-
tions the government could validly have imposed.”). Also, rental values are not easy to calcu-
late, and the blurred boundaries may make it difficult to include lost income.
78. See First English, 482 U.S. at 319.
79. Stein, supra note 6, at 957.
80. Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989). The landowner
must also show that he has pursued compensation through any available state procedures. See
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997) (“[A] plaintiff must demon-
strate that she has both received a ‘final decision regarding the application of the [challenged]
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quirement ensures justiciability by guaranteeing that the agency will
not suddenly change its mind. It is also “necessary to allow the court
to evaluate the ‘economic impact’ and the extent of the challenged
regulation’s interference with ‘reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations.’”81
“The focus of the ‘final decision’ inquiry is on ascertaining the
extent of the governmental restriction on land use.”82 Thus, in the de-
velopment context, the finality requirement is generally met by a
showing that the landowner had permit and variance requests denied
and that there was “a final and authoritative determination of the
type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject
property.”83 However, such a showing is not always required. Indeed,
several circuits and the Supreme Court recognize a futility exception
to the finality requirement.84 Under this exception, “[a] landowner
may avoid the final decision requirement if attempts to comply with
that requirement would be futile.”85 “[T]he submission of a plan for
development is futile if a sufficient number of prior applications have
been rejected by the planning authority.”86 At least one of the applica-
tions submitted by the developer must be meaningful and not ex-
ceedingly grandiose.87 While it may be difficult to determine “when,
regulations to the property at issue’ from ‘the government entity charged with implementing the
regulations,’ and sought ‘compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing
so.’” (quoting Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186,
194 (1985))). This second requirement was not at issue in Del Monte Dunes.
81. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir.)
(quoting Williamson, 473 U.S. at 191), vacated on other grounds, 42 F.3d 626 (11th Cir. 1994).
82. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 746.
83. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). There is
some question about exactly what constitutes final action in these cases. Indeed, the “case law is
muddled” as to how many appeals a landowner must take of a permit denial and to whom.
Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Land-Use Litigation, in TAKINGS AFTER
DOLAN AND LUCAS, supra note 1, at 46, 53; see also id. (noting that repeated denials by a
building inspector do not constitute a final action when appeal to a board of adjustment is avail-
able).
84. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 352 n.8.
85. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (amending a deci-
sion after a rehearing en banc and holding that the landowner had satisfied the ripeness re-
quirement where the county had rejected his proposal and drastically limited the allowable de-
velopment), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); see also Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d
1449, 1454 (9th Cir.) (holding that “the submission of a development plan is excused if such an
application would be an ‘idle and futile act’” (citation omitted)), modified, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir.
1987).
86. Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1454.
87. See Herrington, 857 F.2d at 570; Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1455.
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and how often, reapplication is necessary,”88 it is clear that suspicions
about the motives of local officials and the absence of a variance pro-
cedure are generally not sufficient to satisfy the standard for futility.89
Rather, the landowner bears the burden of persuading the court that
the steps necessary to reach a final determination would be utterly fu-
tile.90
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s
invocation of the futility exception in Del Monte Dunes.91 This analy-
sis was significant because it added to the confusion about whether
the taking in this case was permanent or temporary by complicating
the finality analysis.
III. A TEMPORARY TAKING LEADS TO PERMANENT CONFUSION
Because the developer was denied use of his land only for the
time between the final permit denial and the sale of the property, the
taking in Del Monte Dunes appears, on the surface, to be easily classi-
fied as temporary. In fact, the courts apparently looked no deeper in
implicitly reaching that conclusion. At all stages prior to the Supreme
Court, the parties and judges involved in the Del Monte Dunes litiga-
tion seemingly accepted that, if a taking occurred, it was temporary.
However, the Ninth Circuit did not use the term “temporary taking”
in either of its two opinions. Further, during oral argument before the
Supreme Court, several Justices expressed concern about that as-
sumption. Initially, Justice Breyer inquired, “[T]hat’s what keeps
bothering me. This is a temporary takings case, I take it, and every-
body’s arguing as if it’s not, so I must be wrong, but why?”92 He then
asked the attorney for the United States, arguing as amicus curiae on
behalf of the city, whether he was “saying this is not a temporary
takings case.”93 To this question, the attorney could only reply that he
did not believe that the property was valueless. Indeed, the attorney
was moved to state that “[t]he Court has not really spelled out what
88. Roberts, supra note 83, at 54.
89. See id. at 54-57 (discussing the confusing distinction between “meaningful” and “gran-
diose” proposals in assessing the futility of reapplication).
90. See Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1455.
91. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
92. Oral Argument, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd. (No. 97-1235), at *27 (vis-
ited Nov. 2, 1999) <http://ls.wustl.edu/~mandelke/Land_Use/del_oral.html> (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
93. Id. at *29.
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the standards are” for determining whether a temporary taking has
occurred.94
This confusion over the type of taking that occurred in Del
Monte Dunes arises from two sources. First, Del Monte Dunes does
not present the typical temporary takings scenario because a sale of
the property, rather than a revocation of the land-use restriction, ter-
minated the period during which the taking was effective. Second,
even though compensation was to be awarded for a temporary period
of time, the lower courts did not distinguish between permanent and
temporary takings analysis in determining whether a taking had oc-
curred. The litigation began before the developer sold the property to
the city, and the taking could fairly have been characterized as per-
manent at that time. Because there is no clearly defined test for a
temporary regulatory taking, the jury was instructed using permanent
takings standards. Further, the Ninth Circuit specifically found that
the city would most likely never permit the land to be developed.95
These factors indicate that the taking was permanent, even though
compensation was sought for a limited time.
A. Termination by Sale
When the Supreme Court first recognized temporary regulatory
takings, it defined the term to mean “those regulatory takings which
are ultimately invalidated by the courts.”96 In fact, in First English, the
Court determined that “abandonment [of a land-use restriction] by
the government requires payment of compensation for the period of
time during which regulations deny a landowner all use of his land.”97
Since that time, courts have consistently found takings to be tempo-
rary when they are terminated because regulations are invalidated or
rescinded or the government exercises eminent domain.98 They have
94. Id. at *26.
95. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
96. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 310
(1987).
97. Id. at 318.
98. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997) (holding
that a takings claim is ripe where a final decision forbidding development has been made by the
regulatory agency); First English, 482 U.S. at 319-22; see also Lindfors, supra note 2, at 272 (“A
temporary taking occurs when governmental activity or regulation denies a landowner all prop-
erty use for a period of time and the regulation is later invalidated.”).
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not, however, recognized that a taking can be made temporary by sale
of the property by the landowner.99
This distinction might, at first glance, seem to be nothing more
than semantic nonsense. However, it is not completely novel to re-
gard the cause of termination as relevant to the takings inquiry. In-
deed, it has been argued that governmental actions, when they are in-
validated for being ultra vires, should not give rise to takings claims.100
While that opinion is based upon a belief that the Takings Clause ap-
plies only to “otherwise proper” governmental actions,101 the idea that
the cause of the termination of the land-use restriction is relevant to
determining the type of taking is applicable in Del Monte Dunes.
Moreover, the distinction does have important legal ramifica-
tions. Part of the rationale for recognizing temporary takings is that
“[o]nce a court determines that a taking has occurred, the govern-
ment retains the whole range of options already available – amend-
ment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or
exercise of eminent domain.”102 In other words, a “landowner has no
right under the Just Compensation Clause to insist that a ‘temporary’
taking be deemed a permanent taking.”103 Thus, the taking is tempo-
rary because the government is allowed the flexibility to alter its cir-
cumstances.104 That flexibility is removed when the landowner is al-
lowed to alter the nature of the taking by selling the property.
Further, by recognizing a temporary taking in which a regulation was
neither invalidated nor rescinded, the Court has expanded the realm
of compensable temporary takings without acknowledging that exten-
sion.
99. It is important to note that Del Monte eventually sold the Dunes to the state of Cali-
fornia. However, the sale was not conducted as an exercise of the state’s power of eminent do-
main. See Savage, supra note 17, at 35.
100. See Matthew D. Zinn, Note, Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MICH. L. REV. 245, 245-46 (1998)
(arguing that unauthorized state actions should not give rise to takings claims).
101. Id. at 249 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 318).
102. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
103. Id. at 317.
104. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 738 (1997) (“‘[L]ocal agen-
cies charged with administering regulations governing property development are singularly
flexible institutions; what they take with the one hand they may give back with the other.’”
(quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986))).
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B. Permanent or Temporary Analysis?
On the takings claim, the jury in Del Monte Dunes was instructed
that “it should find for Del Monte if (1) all economically viable use of
the property had been denied; or (2) the City’s decision to reject Del
Monte’s development application did not substantially advance a le-
gitimate public purpose.”105 Because the jury gave a general verdict,
there is no way to know on which of these grounds the jury made its
decision. Nevertheless, it is clear that these standards are the ones es-
tablished to determine if a permanent taking occurred.106
Use of those standards has found support among some members
of the Court who have indicated “that temporary reversible ‘takings’
should be analyzed according to the same constitutional framework
applied to permanent irreversible ‘takings.’”107 It is certainly reason-
able to use the same test to determine, as an initial step, if the gov-
ernmental action rises to the level of a compensable taking. However,
the Supreme Court never has stated that proposition explicitly. While
it seems clear that the differences between permanent and temporary
takings are most important when calculating just compensation, the
Court has provided no guidance on the issue.
Further confusion was created in Del Monte Dunes by the appli-
cation of the futility exception.108 Use of the futility exception re-
quired the developer to emphasize, and the court to scrutinize closely,
each of the city’s permit denials. This scrutiny created a record re-
plete with references to the idea that the city was never going to allow
residential development on the Dunes regardless of the development
proposal. Thus, the reviewing court was left with the strong impres-
sion that, if the city effected a taking by not allowing development, it
did so permanently. That is, the analysis of Del Monte’s claim under
the futility exception easily leads to the conclusion that any use or
value of the property that was taken by the permit denials could not
be returned because the city planning commission would not change
its decision. Clearly, had Del Monte not sold the Dunes, the city
could have changed its mind after trial and allowed development
rather than exercise eminent domain. However, this idea was not dis-
cussed in the lower court opinions.
105. Del Monte Dunes II, 95 F.3d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1996).
106. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
107. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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IV. CLARIFICATION, NOT SEPARATE ANALYSIS
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was not required to resolve
either of the issues discussed above. Rather, it simply accepted the
lower courts’ assumption that the taking was temporary and men-
tioned the issue only twice in its opinion. First, the Court found that
“[t]he posture of the case [did] not present an appropriate occasion to
define with precision the elements of a temporary regulatory takings
claim . . . .”109 Similarly, the Court stated that because “[t]he city did
not challenge below the applicability or continued viability of the
general test for regulatory takings liability . . . . [it would] decline the
suggestions of amici to revisit these precedents.”110 In so doing, the
Court omitted an important step in the analysis and bypassed the op-
portunity to eliminate confusion.
That is not to say, however, that the Court should have designed
an entirely separate test for situations like the one in Del Monte
Dunes. The Court experimented with such a tactic when it established
the new category of per se takings in Lucas. Unfortunately, however,
the procedural efficiencies intended by that opinion have not been
fully realized.111 Certainly, the decision has been hailed for simplifying
certain categories of cases and for closing “the gap between physical
and regulatory takings.”112 However, it has also been roundly criti-
cized for its limited scope and for its further confusion of an already
complicated area of the law.113 In fact, Professor Jed Rubenfeld is of
the opinion that in Lucas, while “purportedly establishing a new
bright-line rule to resolve certain takings difficulties, the Court actu-
ally has added yet another tortuous knot to an already convoluted
doctrine.”114
The perceived deficiencies of the Lucas tests stem, at least in
part, from their sweeping nature. Indeed, Justice Blackmun began his
109. Del Monte Dunes III, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1644 (1999).
110. Id. at 1636.
111. See Freilich et al., supra note 61, at 177 (noting that litigants still attempt to invoke the
categorical rule when they have been deprived of less than all economically viable use of their
property).
112. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 149 (1997). Professor Siegan argues
that Lucas significantly advanced freedom by protecting against legislative deprivations of
property rights. See id.
113. See Freilich et al., supra note 61, at 177.
114. Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1080.
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dissent in that case with the now-famous admonition that “[t]oday the
Court launches a missile to kill a mouse.”115 In Del Monte Dunes, the
Court did not need to be that ambitious. Initially, it should have rec-
ognized that Del Monte Dunes did not present a typical temporary
takings case. The Court then could have stated explicitly that it was
expanding the realm of compensable temporary takings to permit
landowners to preclude the government’s ability to nullify its land-use
decision. Doing so would have resolved the confusion in this case, but
it would have done little to simplify the distinction between perma-
nent and temporary takings.
On the other hand, the Court might have carved an explicit niche
in the existing analytical framework. It could have done so by recog-
nizing that the taking, when it occurred, was permanent. Thus, had
the developer not sold the Dunes, it would have been entitled to fair
compensation for a permanent taking. Making this fact explicit, in
turn, would have allowed the Court to explain why an analysis based
on permanent takings doctrine was appropriate. The Court could
then have explained that the sale of the Dunes by Del Monte to the
state of California did not change the taking itself from permanent to
temporary. Rather, it simply limited the time for which Del Monte
was entitled to compensation. That is, because Del Monte Dunes does
not concern an ordinance that was in place temporarily, there was no
temporary taking. Rather, the permit denials effected a permanent
taking for which the landowner was allowed recompense only for a
limited time. Such a distinction makes sense because the Court has
never before allowed a landowner to determine when a taking
“ends.” There is, however, nothing to prevent the landowner from
limiting his compensation for that taking by selling the property.
Thus, the Court should have stated initially that the taking, if one
occurred, was permanent, because the city did not have the opportu-
nity to reverse its decision. It could then have determined whether the
deprivation required compensation according to the framework de-
scribed in Part II for establishing a permanent taking. Once the taking
was established, the Court could have explained that by selling the
property the developer limited the time for which he was entitled to
115. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Justice Blackmun reasoned that the alleged taking was a protection of health, safety,
and welfare, which, as such, did not warrant compensation under the protection of the Fifth
Amendment. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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compensation.116 In this way, the Court would have made explicit its
rationale for upholding the compensation award without drastically
changing takings law. While such an explanation likely would not
have affected the eventual outcome of the case, it might have allevi-
ated significant confusion in future litigation.
CONCLUSION
Confusion of the sort found in Del Monte Dunes has led some
analysts to complain that takings law is intractably convoluted. At
least one commentator is of the opinion “that the current morass of
Takings Clause jurisprudence demonstrates that the process for re-
solving cases has become more vital to society than seeking to perfect
the substantive constitutional doctrines. Indeed, the notion that such
doctrines can be perfected is a chimera no longer worth pursuing.”117
Suggestions to remedy the situation range from the passage of man-
datory compensation laws118 to shifting the focus of the inquiry to the
use of the property taken rather than the impact on the landowner.119
However, such sweeping changes to takings jurisprudence are
not necessary. Rather, the Supreme Court is well equipped to develop
a more explicit framework in which to resolve takings claims. Del
Monte Dunes presented the Court with an opportunity to simplify fu-
ture takings litigation by providing specific boundaries and particular
rules to use when evaluating temporary takings. Unfortunately, by re-
fusing to take that opportunity, the Court ensured that increasingly
complex fact patterns will continue to complicate the landscape of
takings jurisprudence.
116. Alternatively, the situation could have been explained as a new sort of temporary tak-
ing—one in which the landowner is permitted to preclude the city’s nullifying its land-use deci-
sion. However, as discussed supra Part III.B, such a change would have significantly expanded
the scope of temporary takings for which First English required compensation. See supra notes
97-104 and accompanying text.
117. Bruce Burton, Regulatory Takings, Private Property Protection Acts, and the “Moragne
Principle:” A Proposal for Judicial-Legislative Comity, 49 S.C. L. REV. 83, 88 (1997). Professor
Burton proposes the use of alternative dispute resolution combined with the problem-solving
structures found in the Private Property Protection Act to relieve the uncertainty of litigation in
takings proceedings. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1080-81 (“‘[R]egulatory takings’ occur . . . when their
effect is . . . to put [private] property to a particular state use.”).
